



SFRP-IRPA workshop on reasonableness in the
implementation of the ALARA principle
Introduction of the workshop

Thierry SCHNEIDER, SFRP President

Paris, 23-24 February 2017




- Setting up a SFRP working group to respond to the letter from IRPA on the evolution of the system of radiological protection
- Main conclusions:
 - The key issue is to assess what is reasonable taking into account economic and societal factors;
 - The process of negotiations and the quest for reasonableness would benefit to be further discussed and shared, both at the national and international levels, with all concerned stakeholders;
 - The management of public health in a comprehensive manner should be considered in the context of the implementation of ALARA.


- To further address these challenges SFRP proposed to engage, within IRPA activities, a reflection on:
 - The practical implementation of the ALARA approach with a focus on what is judged "reasonable"
 - The development of holistic risk management approaches to better integrate different risks
- The aim would be to prepare a document on the lessons learned from the sharing of experience

ICRP Publication 22, 1973

“It is then helpful to express the population dose not only in man-rems, but also in **social and economic terms**, for example, in terms of **detriment or monetary units**, so that the advantage of a **reduction in collective dose** can be **compared directly** with the **detriment or cost** of achieving this reduction.” (§ 18)


- Necessity to balance risk and benefit
- Introduction of the monetary values of the person-Sv





Example of monetary values adopted by utilities

Data from ISOE (2010)



- **Unacceptable risk**

- ‘The first word is “unacceptable”, which is used to indicate that the exposure would, in the Commission’s view, **not be acceptable on any reasonable basis in the normal operation** of any practice of which the use was a matter of choice. Such exposures **might have to be accepted in abnormal situations**, such as those during accidents’


- **Tolerable risk**

- ‘Exposures that are **not unacceptable** are then subdivided into those that are “**tolerable**”, meaning that they are **not welcome but can reasonably be tolerated** [...]’.

- **Acceptable risk**

- ‘[...] and “**acceptable**”, meaning that they **can be accepted without further improvement** i.e. when the protection has been optimised’.

Model of tolerability in Publication 60, 1991 (2)



- The "**reasonable**" can **not be defined universally** and therefore refers to the characteristics of the exposure situation
- One of the key challenges: to develop evaluation procedures for **deliberation among stakeholders on what is reasonable**
- Importance of fostering the **emergence of informed and advised stakeholders (radiological protection culture)** allowing them to make effective decisions for their **own protection and well-being** while weighing up the individual and collective dimensions

Societal considerations and values (according ICRP, Pub 101, 2006)

- Equity
- Ability to control (measurement, health surveillance, etc.)
- Sustainability
- Intergenerational considerations
- Individual benefit
- Social benefit
- Level of information/knowledge held by those exposed
- Social trust

- ***For occupational exposures:***
 - Significant reduction of the highest individual exposures since ICRP Publication 60, notably with reduction of dose limits
 - Average individual dose rather low, but distribution of doses depends on the categories of workers
 - Optimisation process largely driven in the 80s and 90s by cost-benefit analysis
 - Monetary values of the person-Sv still used for selecting options of protection in some cases
 - How to integrate and quantify the different components in the optimisation process?
 - How to organise the deliberation on reasonableness?
 - How to develop a holistic approach?

Some issues at stake for the application in nuclear industry (2)

- ***For public exposures:***
 - Induced by discharges of nuclear installations
 - Individual exposures in the range of μSv per year for the representative person
 - Debate on the calculation and use of collective dose
 - Management largely driven by the Best Available Technology (depending on the countries: expressed in activity/Bq or dose/mSv)
 - Role of optimisation to be addressed:
 - Which criteria?
 - Who is deciding about the optimised level?
 - How to involve the public in this process?

- ***For medical staff:***

- Generally coping with high individual doses in interventional radiology/cardiology, with a link between occupational and patient exposure
- Focus during the last decade on the development of radiological protection culture among the medical staff (including the different categories of personnel)

- ***For patients:***

- Dose limit not applicable but, in principle, optimisation should be at the core of the protection strategy
- How to evaluate/judge the balance between benefit and detriment?
- How the patients could be involved in this process?

Some issues at stake for the application in existing exposure situations (1)

- ***For exposure to radon :***
 - Individual doses due to chronic exposures, potentially significant
 - Dependant from the natural background, the building and its use
 - Optimisation driven by adoption of reference levels
 - Individual decision to implement protective actions largely relies on economic factors
- ***For legacy sites:***
 - Doses also due to chronic exposures
 - Main focus on decontamination of the site
 - How far to go?
 - Decision to be made on residual contamination
 - How to decide and who is involved? Considerations on resources limitation

Some issues at stake for the application in existing exposure situations (2)

- ***For post-accident situations:***

- For responders:

- How far to accept the introduction of flexibility in the individual exposures?
- How to judge the optimum level in such circumstances?
- Who could be involved and how to introduce a dynamic process of improvement of the situations?

- For the public:

- Limited use of cost-benefit analysis for the selection of the protection strategies
- Importance of considering the human dimensions for the selection of protection strategies and the long term exposures
- Combination of individual and collective decisions: How to define the optimal level and who has to be involved in this evaluation?

- Review the **current practices** in implementing ALARA
 - **Respective roles of decision-aiding techniques and stakeholders** in establishing reasonable levels of protection.
 - Reflection on ethical and societal values that underpin the concept of reasonableness.
- Share examples of ALARA implementation in different fields of activities
 - who were the stakeholders,
 - what was the decision making process (inside/outside the facility; ±deliberative),
 - what were the priorities (risk; societal demand...),
 - any use of decision aiding techniques or tools,
 - any issues related to the search or meaning of « reasonable »



Looking for a fruitful workshop

